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Abstract 
A bias towards running deficits is an entrenched feature of fiscal policy making in most 
developed economies. Our paper examines whether this tendency is in any way associated 
with the personal distribution of income of a country. It takes inspiration from theoretical 
work according to which distributional conflicts may give rise to deficit spending or to 
delayed fiscal adjustment. Although these theories have been around for years the empirical 
literature on the determinants of fiscal performance has so far paid little or no attention to 
the possible role played by different degrees of income inequality. Our results suggest that 
this neglect was not justified. Using cross-country data we find evidence that a more 
unequal distribution of income can weigh on a country's fiscal performance. These findings 
can be relevant in the aftermath of the post-2007 global financial and economic crisis in 
particular when designing fiscal exist strategies. The success and sustainability of such 
strategies may inter alia depend on their distributional implications. 
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When that the poor have cried, Caesar hath wept 
William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Scene II 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the 1970s, fiscal policy making in a large number of OECD economies has run afoul 
of one central prediction of Barro's tax smoothing paradigm (1979), namely that budget 
balances would even out over time. Persistent deficits in peacetime, which over the years 
accumulated to sizeable levels of government debt, have become an entrenched feature of 
fiscal policy. On the back of these developments, a rich political economy literature has 
developed examining the determinants of fiscal profligacy. An early and comprehensive 
review of the respective branch of the literature is by Alesina and Perotti (1995).  
Among the competing models that seek to explain the persisting deficit bias two dominate 
the empirical literature and the political debate: fiscal illusion and geographically or other 
wise dispersed interests. Fiscal illusion, which includes the issue of political business 
cycles, essentially assumes that voters do not grasp that deficits will have to be financed by 
future tax increases or expenditure cuts. The model of dispersed interests is somewhat more 
involved. It is an application of the 'fishing-from-a-common-pool' problem, where political 
representatives, when assessing spending proposals, consider only the costs and benefits for 
their respective constituency ignoring the effect on the overall tax burden: the aggregate 
result is overspending. By now, the 'common pool' problem has become the main starting 
point of the growing strand of the literature examining ways to tackle the deficit bias. One 
of the first and particularly active scholars to empirically investigate the interaction 
between the 'common pool' problem oin public finances and institutional arrangements is 
von Hagen and his co-authors (see for instance von Hagen, 1992, von Hagen and Harden, 
1994, and von Hagen and Poterba, 1999).  
Explanations other than the fiscal illusion and 'common pool' problem, in particular 
distributional conflicts and intergenerational redistribution, which are part of the standard 
repertoire of the political economy of the budget deficit, have, to our knowledge, inspired 
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comparatively little or no empirical work. Our paper ventures into this less travelled road of 
the empirical literature and investigates the link between fiscal performance and income 
inequality. The basic idea underlying the models on which we stage our work is that 
political 'struggles' between different social groups, including the 'poor' and the 'rich', can 
delay fiscal adjustment towards balanced budgets and/or lead to the accumulation of debt to 
be born by future generations.  
Possible reasons why distributional conflicts and intergenerational distribution have so far 
received relatively little attention in the empirical literature dealing with the political 
economy of the budget deficit include: (i) data on income distribution are less readily 
available and potentially less reliable than other macroeconomic indicators; (ii) the 
relationship between income distribution and fiscal performance is likely to be complex in 
the sense that income inequality as such may not necessarily lead to overspending; rather it 
may involve a number of interactions with other variables such as political institutions; and 
(iii) more generally and importantly, issues of income distribution have for a long time 
been marginalized in mainstream economics. Only recently, after decades of increasing 
inequality of income in some developed countries and a visibly skewed distribution of 
income gains generated in boom periods - such as the ITC boom in the second half of the 
1990s as well as the expansion of the financial industry up until the onset of the post-2007 
global financial and economic crisis - the public eye and the economic profession are 
gradually rediscovering the personal distribution of income as a relevant economic issue. 
To take an example from the public debate that is particularly close to the topic of our 
paper, the view that income distribution may feed back onto fiscal policy was also 
hypothesised in the financial press.1 
Against this background, our empirical analysis concentrates on the relationship between 
fiscal performance and income inequality. Our prior is that income inequality may give rise 
to stronger distributional conflicts which in turn can lead to some kind of 'soothing' increase 
                                                            
1 'There is little evidence that inequality affects the societies' desire for redistribution at the ballot box. 
However, there is evidence that if those in the middle of the income distribution feel greater affinity with the 
poor, democracies tend to vote for more redistribution';  Chris Giles in Financial Times, 16 December 2009, 
FT.COM: Social scars from an unequal crisis. 
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in spending unmatched by revenue increases. The results of our analysis warrant 
conclusions that complement the conventional lessons about how to deal with the deficit 
bias. In fact, we find evidence that income inequality can weigh on public finances through 
various channels. For  instance, income inequality seems to dampen the effect of economic 
growth on the budget. As a result, income inequality can hamper fiscal discipline and 
adjustment.  
Admittedly, we do not expect distributional conflicts or income distribution to be the 
dominant determinant of the deficit bias or for that matter to be more important than the 
'common pool' problem. However, we argue that the distribution of income can and is 
playing a significant role, a role that so far has been overlooked and that is likely to be of 
importance for ongoing and prospective fiscal adjustment processes aimed at correcting the 
dismal and unsustainable fiscal situation that has build up in the wake of the Great 
Recession. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews models in the 
political economy literature that postulate or imply that distributional conflicts or income 
inequality may lead to excessive spending and to an accumulation of debt. Section 3 
describes our data set, including five different sources of inequality measures. Section 4 
discussed the results of our empirical analysis which is divided into two parts. The first 
part, based on a simple analysis of variance, presents a number of stylized facts concerning 
fiscal performance, political institutions, social conflicts and income distribution. The 
second part reviews the results of panel regressions examining the link between fiscal 
performance as measured by the budget balance to GDP ratio and indicators of personal 
income distribution while controlling for other possible determinants of the budget balance. 
Section 5 discusses policy implications of our empirical findings and concludes. 
 
2. The political economy of the budget deficit: the role of distributional conflicts 
As highlighted eloquently by Atkinson (1997), the analysis of personal income distribution 
has for a long time not been at the core of main stream or modern neoclassical economics: 
it was, to use his own words, out in the cold. Allocation and efficiency have 'naturally' 
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dominated the focus of attention. Income inequality was largely considered to be a social or 
political issue. The only area of modern neoclassical economics that has consistently 
addressed issues of income distribution is growth theory, and related to that, development 
economics. A particularly striking piece of evidence for the relative neglect of main-stream 
economics vis-à-vis income inequality is that none of the widely used macroeconomic 
textbooks on the market features sections on the possible interactions between income 
distributions and key macroeconomic variables. 
Nonetheless, there is one branch of the economic literature, where the distribution of 
income has typically featured somewhat more prominently: public choice or political 
economy. The analysis of how the interplay between conflicting interests and collective 
decision making shapes economic outcomes includes models where the heterogeneity 
across individuals is in the level of income. These models examine how varying degrees of 
income inequality can affect economic policy making and, in turn, economic outcomes. 
Overall, the variety of political economy models involving income distribution can be 
divided into two broad groups.  
The first focuses on the redistribution of pre-tax income via the political process. The key 
questions addressed by this class of models is when and how the political process generates 
tax and transfer programs that lead to a re-distribution of income across the currently alive 
generations, typically but not necessarily, from the rich to the poor. Prominent examples are 
Meltzer and Richards (1981) and Dixit and Londregan (1996). One prime conclusion of this 
type of research is that an unequal income distribution (as measured by the median voter's 
relative income) will produce the necessary political majority in favour of redistributive 
expenditure and tax programmes; more specifically, the more unequal the distribution of 
income the higher the level of redistributive spending.  
Obviously, redistribution per se does not necessarily entail fiscal profligacy, as 
governments can well implement redistribution with balanced budgets. However, there is a 
possible interaction between the degree of redistribution and economic growth that may 
make the balancing of the budget more difficult when redistribution is large. In particular, 
Bertola (1993) and Person and Tabellini (1994) have, among others, argued that 
redistributive spending will affect growth because of the distortive effect of taxation and 
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the crowding out of investment. On this basis, one could reasonably hypothesise that in a 
more unequal society with higher demand for redistributive spending lower economic 
growth may complicate the government process aimed at accommodating competing claims 
on the budget as compared to a more equal society with lower redistributive spending and 
higher growth. 
In the second group of political economy models involving income inequality the focus is 
less on the determinants of traditional redistributive policies. Rather, the heterogeneity 
across individuals in the level of income represents an element that may affect macro 
outcomes, including fiscal performance. Very often the main difference compared to the 
first group of models is an intergenerational dimension where income inequality can lead to 
redistribution from living to future generations by running government deficits and 
accumulating debt.  
Cuckierman and Meltzer (1989), for instance, developed a framework where poor and 
liquidity constrained households want to run government deficits while rich households can 
adjust their economic plans to any fiscal policy profile. In a similar vein, Tabellini (1991) 
proposes a setup where debt is accumulated because future generations are not present 
when new government debt is issued. Government debt is nonetheless honoured because 
the old and the children of the wealthy (who hold a large quantity of the debt) chose to do 
so.  
Beyond the intergenerational framework, distributional conflicts can affect fiscal 
performance also by delaying necessary reforms. It is a fact of modern political life that a 
multitude of social and political constraints hampers and defers the implementation of 
reform programs, such as fiscal consolidation, even when the economic case is clear and 
compelling. One of the main and, after all, evident findings of the relatively rich literature 
on inaction and delay is that procrastination is a function of how the costs of reform are 
distributed: the more unequal the distribution of the costs of reform the stronger the 
resistance to change. This point is for instance made by Alesina and Drazen (1991) in 
connection with fiscal stabilization. Using a war of attrition model, they show that (i) 
struggles among social groups over the distribution of the required fiscal adjustment delays 
the consolidation effort and (ii) the delay increases if the consolidation programme is 
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'inequitable'. Distributional aspects feature even more prominently in the model of delayed 
fiscal stabilisation by Hsieh (1997) where 'workers' bargain with 'capitalists' over the 
respective share of the adjustment costs. 
In spite of the relatively rich theoretical political economy literature involving issues of 
income distribution or distributional conflicts there are, to our knowledge, very few 
empirical studies examining in a systematic way the possible link between income 
distribution and fiscal policy performance. In the empirical macro literature, the distribution 
of personal income has, together with a plethora of other candidates, been mainly examined 
as potential determinant of economic growth in cross-country growth regressions. A useful 
review of that type of research, which boomed in 1990s, and unambiguously concluded that 
inequality reduces economic growth, is provided in Aghion et al. (1999).  
Empirical studies closer to the economic policy models discussed above do exist but 
generally try to establish whether and how income inequality affects the size of government 
or the composition of government expenditure; see for instance Perotti (1996). By contrast, 
the question of whether inequality may lead to higher deficits and, in turn, to a stronger 
accumulation of debt has not been investigated so far. 
3. Our dataset(s) 
Our dataset covers over 30 middle-income and industrial countries, mostly OECD 
members, over the period 1960-2008 and comprises three different types of data: data on 
income inequality, national accounts including fiscal variables and data on political and 
societal institutions. The choice of countries was essentially dictated by the availability of 
public finance data. The list of countries considered in our study and a detailed description 
of all the variables used, including their respective source, is provided in the Annex. 
While quality is a pervasive issue with all kinds of data, it is thought to be particularly 
severe for measures of the personal distribution of income. Reflecting, among other things, 
the relative inattention devoted to the subject of income distribution by the economic 
profession and, more generally, by politics in developed countries, there is no commonly 
agreed methodological basis for the construction of distribution data. In spite of some 
recent progress in the EU and the OECD, the availability of comparable data is still limited. 
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All existing secondary datasets covering a sufficiently long period of time and a sufficiently 
large cross-section of countries suffer, to varying degrees, from the same type of caveat: the 
comparison of income inequality across time and countries is hampered by methodological 
breaks, differences in coverage, units of reference and or/income concept. The 
corresponding pitfalls have been examined in the literature; for a very comprehensive 
discussion see Atkinson and Brandolini (2001). 
Our approach to dealing with the likely quality issues of distribution data is to carry out our 
empirical analysis for a series of common and readily available secondary data sets, in 
particular, the 2008-update of the UNU-WIDER database, the data-set constructed by 
Deininger and Squire (1996), figures from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), the OECD 
and EUROSTAT. 
Evidently, the main idea of our approach is to check the robustness of our results across 
alternative sources of distribution data. This tactic may not be fail-safe, as alternative data 
sources may share common problems. However, it gives us a higher degree of confidence 
compared to existing studies involving distribution data that rely on one secondary data source 
only. 
Among the alternative measures of income inequality (Gini coefficient, quintile, decile, or 
percentile group shares) we concentrate on the Gini-coefficient as it offers the broadest 
coverage across time and countries across the different sources considered. The exception is the 
OECD dataset where the 9th to the 1st decile ratio allows for a larger coverage compared to the 
Gini-coefficient.2 
The availability of Gini coefficients within the individual datasets is uneven both across time 
and countries, especially in the 1960s, the 1970s and, to some extent, also in the 1980s. 
Consecutive annual figures are generally available only from the early 1990s onward. A 
detailed description of the time and cross-section dimension of the different distribution 
datasets is provided in the Annex. 
The by far most comprehensive set of figures is the one provided by the 2008-update of the 
UNU-WIDER project. For the 35 countries considered in our study it offers more than 2300 
                                                            
2  The decile ratio measures average income of decile i in terms of average income of decile j. 
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Gini estimates over the period 1960-2008. The large number of observations is explained by the 
fact that UNU-WIDER collects estimates from a whole variety of different sources, which 
means that in many years more than one estimate per country is provided. Hence, when 
constructing our panel we had to discriminate among the available figures for individual years. 
As the source of the alternative estimates changes across time, within countries and across 
countries our choice could only be heuristic. Nevertheless, we followed the following principle: 
whenever possible we chose estimates that are based on disposable income, for which 
households are the recipient unit and that provide for a full coverage of the population. No 
selection of alternative estimates was necessary for the other distribution datasets, as they 
provide only one inequality measure for a given year in a given country.3  
Surprisingly or not, the inequality measures from different sources tend to be strongly 
correlated. Except for the OECD decile ratios, cross-correlations are close or above 0.8. The 
relatively weak co-movement of the decile ratios with respect to the Gini coefficients may be 
explained by the fact that (i) the former capture only a part of the distributional spectrum while 
the latter represents a synthetic measure of the entire distribution and (ii) the income concept 
underlying the decile ratios is gross earnings of employees as opposed to disposable income of 
all households for the other four datasets. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
Our empirical analysis aimed at testing the link between fiscal performance and personal 
income distributions proceeds in two steps. We first take a preliminary look at the data 
performing some simple statistical inference to find out whether countries with an, on 
average, more uneven distribution of income exhibit statistically significant differences 
with regard to a selection of fiscal and political variables compared to countries with a 
more even distribution of income. 
                                                            
3 This is not entirely true for the Deininger Squire (1996) set, which in some cases offers multiple estimates 
for a given year and country. However, the 'over-determination' can be avoided by selecting the estimates 
marked as 'accept' indicating a high data quality. 
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After that we proceed to a more involved statistical examination of how a country's 
personal distribution of income may impact on fiscal performance controlling for a range of 
other potential determinants of fiscal performance and possible interactions among them. 
 
Analysis of variance: comparing means 
An admittedly crude but still useful way to commence our empirical examination is a one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA). To that end we first divide our sample(s) into two 
groups using the average Gini coefficient as discriminators. We then compare means across 
the groups to check whether they exhibit statistically significant differences with respect to 
the variables of interest. For the sake of convenience, the variables of interest are divided 
into three groups: fiscal variables, political/institutional variables and measures of the 
degree of conflict. The full list is provided in the tables below.4 
Table 1: Equal versus unequal distribution of income - comparing means 
UNU-WIDER inequality measures (Gini coefficients)
1960-2008
Gini 
above 
average
Gini 
below 
average
Test for 
equality
Code Variables Mean Count Mean Count Total prob. Value
BB Budget balance (% of GDP) -2.64 172 -1.94 376 548 0.08
SS Social spending (% of GDP) 13.80 119 16.27 313 432 0.00
DEBTR General government debt (%of GDP) 52.99 195 58.84 342 537 0.02
EXECRR Political orientation of government  (1=right, 0=centre-left) 0.53 241 0.38 418 659 0.00
MAJ Margin of majority 0.52 227 0.59 433 660 0.00
GOVSP Largest party of government with special interests (Dummy) 0.04 254 0.14 450 704 0.00
HERFGO Herfindhal index of government 0.79 227 0.68 433 660 0.00
LEGEL Economic freedom (index) 0.27 253 0.27 435 688 0.99
FR Legislative elections (Dummy) 0.21 81 0.10 243 324 0.42
ECOFR Fiscal rules (index) 6.41 259 6.77 427 686 0.00
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government demonstrations 1.14 307 0.72 449 756 0.01
SFTPUHVL Number of major political crises, conflicts 1.42 307 0.46 454 761 0.00
STABS Number of veto players leaving office 0.13 229 0.13 426 655 0.80
 
                                                            
4 A more detailed description of all the non-fiscal variables used in the empirical analysis, including their 
source, is provided in the Annex. 
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Deininger and Squire (1997) inequality measures (Gini coefficients - quality score=accept)
1960-1996
Gini 
above 
average
Gini 
below 
average
Test for 
equality
Code Variables Mean Count Mean Count Total prob. Value
BB Budget balance (% of GDP) -4.28 67 -3.39 71 138 0.23
SS Social spending (% of GDP) 11.44 49 14.37 62 111 0.00
DEBTR General government debt (%of GDP) 50.16 90 58.01 83 173 0.03
EXECRR Political orientation of government  (1=right, 0=centre-left) 0.57 96 0.36 115 211 0.00
MAJ Margin of majority 0.54 89 0.65 115 204 0.00
GOVSP Largest party of government with special interests (Dummy) 0.00 99 0.08 118 217 0.00
HERFGO Herfindhal index of government 0.85 89 0.75 115 204 0.01
ECOFR Economic freedom (index) 5.87 107 6.31 101 208 0.00
LEGEL Legislative elections (Dummy) 0.31 98 0.29 117 215 0.81
FR Fiscal rules (index) -0.57 9 -0.79 19 28 0.43
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government demonstrations 1.07 118 1.27 154 272 0.50
SFTPUHVL Number of major political crises, conflicts 0.38 118 1.22 154 272 0.01
STABS Number of veto players leaving office 0.13 84 0.13 108 192 0.97
 
OECD inequality measures (decile ratios - D9/D1)
1970-2008
Decile ratio 
above 
average
Decile 
ratio below 
average
Test for 
equality
Code Variables Mean Count Mean Count Total prob. Value
BB Budget balance (% of GDP) -1.77 156 -1.54 216 372 0.55
SS Social spending (% of GDP) 13.61 140 17.72 185 325 0.00
DEBTR General government debt (%of GDP) 47.90 174 60.40 213 387 0.00
EXECRR Political orientation of government  (1=right, 0=centre-left) 0.49 158 0.51 232 390 0.77
MAJ Margin of majority 0.54 159 0.55 238 397 0.15
GOVSP Largest party of government with special interests (Dummy) 0.01 162 0.10 240 402 0.00
HERFGO Herfindhal index of government 0.86 159 0.62 238 397 0.00
ECOFR Economic freedom (index) 6.57 178 6.70 204 382 0.21
LEGEL Legislative elections (Dummy) 0.31 162 0.27 240 402 0.44
FR Fiscal rules (index) 0.15 65 0.51 107 172 0.03
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government demonstrations 1.65 109 0.46 206 315 0.00
SFTPUHVL Number of major political crises, conflicts 1.19 109 0.27 206 315 0.00
STABS Number of veto players leaving office 0.10 157 0.14 234 391 0.09
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Luxembourg income study inequality measures (Gini coefficients)
(1967-2005)
Gini 
above 
average
Gini 
below 
average
Test for 
equality
Code Variables Mean Count Mean Count Total prob. Value
BB Budget balance (% of GDP) -2.62 54 -1.67 71 125 0.23
SS Social spending (% of GDP) 11.59 48 18.18 61 109 0.00
DEBTR General government debt (%of GDP) 62.30 43 58.20 71 133 0.51
EXECRR Political orientation of government  (1=right, 0=centre-left) 0.39 62 0.41 83 145 0.79
MAJ Margin of majority 0.54 64 0.57 86 150 0.12
GOVSP Largest party of government with special interests (Dummy) 0.02 65 0.18 88 153 0.00
HERFGO Herfindhal index of government 0.79 64 0.59 86 150 0.00
ECOFR Economic freedom (index) 7.01 64 6.88 79 143 0.40
LEGEL Legislative elections (Dummy) 0.23 65 0.25 87 152 0.75
FR Fiscal rules (index) -0.32 23 0.13 43 66 0.09
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government demonstrations 1.08 50 0.99 85 135 0.83
SFTPUHVL Number of major political crises, conflicts 2.46 50 0.19 81 131 0.01
STABS Number of veto players leaving office 0.15 64 0.08 85 149 0.09
 
EUROSTAT inequality measures (Gini coefficients)
1995-2008
Gini 
above 
average
Gini 
below 
average
Test for 
equality
Code Variables Mean Count Mean Count Total prob. Value
BB Budget balance (% of GDP) -2.02 110 0.02 129 239 0.00
SS Social spending (% of GDP) 16.28 94 19.70 116 210 0.00
DEBTR General government debt (%of GDP) 73.30 96 58.40 119 215 0.00
EXECRR Political orientation of government  (1=right, 0=centre-left) 0.40 86 0.32 99 185 0.31
MAJ Margin of majority 0.54 92 0.57 101 193 0.08
GOVSP Largest party of government with special interests (Dummy) 0.13 92 0.23 101 193 0.08
HERFGO Herfindhal index of government 0.80 92 0.52 101 193 0.00
ECOFR Economic freedom (index) 7.28 93 7.02 102 195 0.01
LEGEL Legislative elections (Dummy) 0.26 92 0.24 101 193 0.71
FR Fiscal rules (index) 0.23 107 0.75 119 226 0.01
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government demonstrations 0.55 62 0.24 116 116 0.09
SFTPUHVL Number of major political crises, conflicts 0.46 61 0.00 48 109 0.32
STABS Number of veto players leaving office 0.17 92 0.09 101 193 0.04
 
The results of the means comparison, which on the whole do not include big surprises, can 
be summarised as follows. As regards fiscal policy, the key thing to note is that countries 
with a lower-than-average score of income inequality tend to record lower budget deficits 
and a higher share of social spending in total government expenditure. This result is 
consistent for all the sources of distribution data considered, but the difference concerning 
the budget deficit is not always statistically significant.  
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Turning to political factors, we find that an above-average degree of income inequality 
tends to be associated with a prevalence of governments from the right, with a stronger 
degree of political concentration in government, and with governments that represent a 
wider spectrum of interests.  
The mean comparison based on the index of Economic Freedom is less conclusive. For 
three out of the five data sources a lower-than average degree of income inequality is 
associated with a higher score of economic freedom; in two cases it is the other way round. 
A somewhat clearer picture emerges with respect to measures of political instability. The 
number of anti-government protests or the number of major political crises/conflicts or both 
turn out to significantly discriminate between countries with a below or above average 
inequality score. Specifically, political instability is more frequent in more unequal 
societies.  
Panel regressions  
The distribution and redistribution of income involve complex economic, social and 
political processes. In the following we do not pretend to unveil the intricacies and details 
of how different degrees of inequality may affect aggregate fiscal performance. Our aim is 
to throw light on a number of aggregate channels associated with the predictions of the 
theoretical literature reviewed above. More specifically, we take a look at the following set 
of issues/questions: 
(i) Does inequality always produce pressure on public finances or does it work via a 
specific political affiliation of government? This question is based on the presumption 
that inequality is likely to interact with prevailing political constellations or prevailing 
societal values: societies where a majority trusts in the virtues and opportunities of the 
free market may tend to accept a more unequal distribution of income and pursue fiscal 
discipline as opposed to societies where a majority accepts the need to correct market 
outcomes through fiscal policy interventions, including through deficit spending. 
(ii) Does political or social instability play a role? In this case the underlying 
consideration is rather straightforward. A more unequal distribution of income can be 
assumed to translate into a deterioration of the government's fiscal balance when 
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combined with political instability. Faced with ‘pressure from the streets’ policy makers 
may be inclined to respond by running deficits. By contrast, an unequal distribution of 
income coupled with political stability may allow for a more reasoned fiscal policy.  
(iii) To the extent that inequality matters for fiscal performance, what is the interaction 
with economic growth? Does a more unequal distribution have a systematic effect on 
how additional public resources generated by economic growth impact on the budget 
balance? Conceivably, governments facing a more unequal distribution of income may 
find it more difficult to entirely assign additional revenues to the improvement of public 
finances. 
We approach these issues/questions by running reduced-form panel regressions using the 
following class of specifications. 
(1)  ∑ ∑ +++++= −
j j
tititijjtitijjtiiti zxzxbcb ,,,,,1,, εγγβα  
tib ,  measures the budget-balance-to-GDP ratio of country i in year t, tijx , stands for the 
realisation of explanatory variable j of country i in year t, tiz ,  denotes the measure of 
income inequality, i.e. the Gini coefficient or the decile ratios, and ti,ε  represents an 
independent and identically-distributed random effect. The country-specific constant ic  
captures country-fixed effects.  
The explanatory variables x and z enter equation (1) in two different ways: in an additive 
and a multiplicative fashion. The additive terms ∑ +
j
titijj zx ,, γβ  are meant to capture the 
individual effects on fiscal performance whereas the multiplicative terms ∑
j
titijj zx ,,γ  are 
expected to capture likely interactions notably between inequality z and other determinates 
of fiscal performance x. Interaction terms can be interpreted as kind of slope dummies 
where the effect an explanatory variable x brings to bear on the independent variable 
depends on a third mediating factor. In our case this mediating factor of interest is the 
distribution of income.  
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The total effect of a variable jx  on fiscal performance as measured by the budget-balance-
to-GDP ratio ib  can be written as tijtijj xz ,, )( γβ +  where on top of the direct effect 
captured by the coefficient jβ  there is a second component tij z ,γ  the size of which depends 
on the measure of income distribution.5  
In concrete terms, our specification strategy is the following. We start with a set of 
equations where explanatory variables, including the measure of inequality, are introduced 
individually, that is without interactions. These equations can be termed as 'conventional 
fiscal reaction functions' that are very common in the literature (see for instance Bohn, 
1998, Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2002 and Gali and Perotti, 2003). As a second step 
we augment our equations with interaction terms to see whether the distribution of income 
has an impact on fiscal performance in combination with other variables, as hypothesised 
above. All our panels are estimated by Generalised Least Squares (GLS) with country fixed 
effects. 
The results of our first battery of panel regressions are summarised in Table 2, which is 
divided into five sections. Each section refers to one of the alternative sets of distribution 
data discussed in Section 3 (i.e. UNU-WIDER, Deininger and Squire (DS), LIS, OECD and 
EUROSTAT). The number of observations and the time period are not constant across 
specifications. They are a function of the availability of the distribution data which varies 
considerably across sources.  
On top of the inequality measure (i.e. Gini coefficient or decile ratio) our choice of 
explanatory variables was mainly inspired by the existing empirical literature which has 
established a number of factors that turned out to play a statistically significant role across 
different studies, such as fiscal and cyclical conditions as well as political and institutional 
                                                            
5 The main difference compared to actual slope dummies is that the moderating or accelerating factor z is not 
a binary but a metric variable. 
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features of a country, including elections and fiscal rules.6 A detailed definition of the 
political and institutional variables used in our regression analysis is provided in the Annex. 
The lagged dependent variable is mainly included for econometric reasons, so as to capture 
the considerable degree of inertia in the budget balance, and should not be interpreted as 
capturing the state of public finances strictu sensu. Ideally, one would like to assess 
prevailing fiscal conditions by means of the debt-to-GDP ratio and possibly expect a 
negative relationship in the sense that a higher degree of indebtedness may induce policy 
makers to reduce the deficit in order to safeguard the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. However, comparable figures of gross liabilities of general government are fairly 
limited across both time and countries. They are reasonably complete to be included in 
regressions with the inequality measures from the LIS, OECD and EURSTAT dataset, yet 
do not yield convincing results. The estimated coefficient is not statistically significant, and 
in two out of three cases has an algebraic sign (positive) that conflicts with our prior. 
 
                                                            
6 Examples of this growing body of the empirical literature are Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2002), Buti 
and van den Noord (2003), Gali and Perotti (2001), Manasse (2006) and European Commission (2006). 
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Table 2: Panel regressions – no interactions terms 
 
Unbalanced panels. GLS estimation with country fixed effects and White cross-section weights.
Dependent variable: budget balance-to-GDP ratio
b(-1) 0.73 0.51 0.51 0.66 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.72 0.62 0.65 0.72 0.72 0.45 0.48
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DEBTR(-1)  -  - - - - - 0.02  - - 0.02 - 0.01 -0.02 -
 -  - - - - - (0.32)  - - (0.27) - (0.51) (0.21) -
GINI(-1) -0.07 -0.15 -0.15 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 1.76 2.95 1.22 1.51 -0.06 -0.06
(0.01)  (0.22) (0.20) (0.97) (0.92) (0.86) (0.66)  (0.84) (0.13) (0.14) (0.02) (0.01) (0.45) (0.49)
dlog(GDP) 33.48 33.68 33.29 37.38 33.83 46.50 43.92 45.38 38.39 40.88 43.17 46.61 41.27 37.52
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
dlog(GDP(-1))  -  - - - - - -  - - - - - - 20.85
 -  - - - - - -  - - - - - - (0.04)
ECOFR 0.91 1.41 1.42 0.40 - - -  - - - - - - -
 (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.27) - - -  - - - - - - -
FR  - 0.54 0.55 - - 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.63 0.57 - - 0.33 0.38
 - (0.04) (0.04) - - (0.13) (0.22)  (0.45) (0.00) (0.02) - - (0.16) (0.06)
LEGEL -0.39 -0.61 -0.66 -0.46 -0.27 -0.28 -0.09 -0.82 -0.51 -0.51 -0.38 -0.39 -0.89 -0.89
 (0.09)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.18) (0.49) (0.64) (0.88)  (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.07) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
EXECRR 0.27 0.75 0.75 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.48 0.44 0.52 0.80 0.08 0.19 - -
 (0.27) (0.03) (0.04) (0.56) (0.47) (0.22) (0.35)  (0.19) (0.08) (0.02) (0.68) (0.38) - -
EXECRR(-1)  -  - - - - - -  - - - - - 0.53 0.48
 -  - - - - - -  - - - - - (0.02) (0.04)
BNKV1052 -0.07 -0.23 -0.24 -0.07 -0.06 - - -0.25 - - - - - -
 (0.27)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.64) (0.68) - -  (0.22) - - - - - -
STABS  -  - -0.33 - -0.10 - -  - - - - - - -
 -  - (0.63) - (0.87) - -  - - - - - - -
Number of observations 326 165 165 99 102 60 51 53 146 138 329 304 146 158
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.00 2.15 2.12 1.98 2.06 1.33 1.07 1.42 2.45 2.57 2.09 2.16 2.11 2.21
Notes: (1) for OECD the inequality measure is the decile ratio (D9/D1). Numbers in brackets are p-values.
Depedenent variables: b=budget balance-to-GDP ratio; DEBTR= government debt-to-GDP ratio; ECOFR= index of economic freedom; FR= qulaity of fiscal rules (index); LEGEL= legislative election (dummy); EXECRR= political orientation of 
government (1=right, 0=centre-left); BNKV1052= number of anti-government protests; STABS=number of veto players stepping down. A more detailed description of the political variables is provided in the Annex.
Sets of distribution data
D&S LIS OECD(1) EUROSTATUNU-WIDER
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Table 3: Panel regressions – no interaction terms 
Unbalanced panels. GLS estimation with country fixed effects and White cross-section weights.
Dependent variable: budget balance to GDP ratio
b(-1) 0.70 0.45 0.45 0.55 0.66 0.70 0.75 0.66 0.52 0.55 0.64 0.64 0.41 0.44
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DEBTR(-1)  -  - - - - 0.02  - - 0.03 - 0.01 -0.01 -
 -  - - - - (0.47)  - - (0.18) - (0.60) (0.40) -
GINI(-1) -0.05 -0.12 -0.12 0.03 0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.08 1.83 3.10 1.57 1.77 -0.01 -0.01
(0.12)  (0.34) (0.34) (0.77) (0.88) (0.69) (0.86)  (0.77) (0.13) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.89) (0.87)
dlog(GDP(-1)) 18.59 25.04 24.76 34.66 33.82 29.19 31.98 26.21 36.35 37.53 30.96 32.84 35.42 30.22
(0.02)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ECOFR 1.03 1.78 1.78 0.24 - - -  - - - - - - -
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) - - -  - - - - - - -
FR  - 0.66 0.67 - - 0.53 0.36 0.53 0.82 0.74 - - 0.35 0.40
 - (0.00) (0.00) - - -0.12 (0.35)  (0.38) (0.00) (0.00) - - (0.21) (0.10)
LEGEL -0.29 -0.72 -0.73 -0.26 -0.14 -0.03 0.04 -0.66 -0.58 -0.55 -0.33 -0.37 -0.88 -0.84
 (0.31)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.44) (0.71) -0.96 (0.95)  (0.32) (0.09) (0.07) (0.17) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00)
EXECRR 0.16 0.63 0.16 -0.20 -0.035 0.5 0.11 0.15 0.70 0.97 0.13 0.22 - -
 (0.53) (0.04) (0.53) (0.74) (0.96) -0.32 (0.86)  (0.76) (0.03) (0.00) (0.55) (0.37) - -
EXECRR(-1)  -  - - - - - -  - - - - - 0.32 0.30
 -  - - - - - -  - - - - - (0.01) (0.02)
BNKV1052 -0.07 -0.28 -0.29 -0.02 -0.03 - - -0.24 - - - - - -
 (0.29)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.86) (0.85) - -  (0.31) - - - - - -
STABS  -  - -0.12 - -0.22 - -  - - - - - - -
 -  - (0.85) - (0.65) - -  - - - - - - -
Number of observations 323 163 163 98 101 60 51 53 146 138 329 304 146 158
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.04 2.29 2.28 1.78 1.88 0.99 1.32 0.92 2.44 2.57 2.02 2.05 2.09 2.19
Notes: (1) for OECD the inequality measure is the decile ratio (D9/D1). Numbers in brackets are p-values.
Dependent variables: b=budget balance-to-GDP ratio; DEBTR= government debt-to-GDP ratio; ECOFR= index of economic freedom; FR= quality of fiscal rules (index); LEGEL= legislative election (dummy); EXECRR= political orientation of 
government (1=right, 0=centre-left); BNKV1052= number of anti-government protests; STABS=number of veto players stepping down. A more detailed description of the political variables is provided in the Annex.
Sets of distribution data
UNU-WIDER D&S LIS OECD(1) EUROSTAT
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Table 4: Panel regressions – interaction terms 
Unbalanced panels. GLS estimation with country fixed effects and White cross-section weights.
Dependent variable: budget balance to GDP ratio
D&S EUROSTAT
b(-1) 0.78 0.78 0.49 0.73 0.73 0.43 0.70 0.62 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.71 0.71 0.47 0.42
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GINI(-1) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.19 0.19 0.06 0.07 1.66 1.67 0.07 0.02
 (0.76) (0.80) (0.88) (0.32) (0.34) (0.28) (0.47) (0.93) (0.12) (0.13) (0.63) (0.61) (0.07) (0.01) (0.44) (0.73)
dlog(GDP) 72.98 73.37 96.02 88.64 89.28 105.42 26.09 24.59 81.35 82.29 95.13 97.15 79.66 79.76 96.14 45.04
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.64) (0.71) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.58)
ECOFR 0.63 0.63  - 0.82 0.82 - 0.12 0.51 -0.03 -0.02 -0.17 -0.18 - - - -
 (0.00)  (0.00)  - (0.00) (0.00) - (0.73) (0.19) (0.94) (0.95) (0.81) (0.80) - - - -
FR  -  - 0.61 - - 0.70 - - -  - - - - - 0.27 0.40
 -  - (0.00) - - (0.01) - - -  - - - - - (0.12) (0.13)
LEGEL -0.37 -0.37 -0.50 -0.31 -0.31 -0.47 -0.43 -0.35 -0.12 -0.12 -0.43 -0.45 -0.35 -0.36 -0.82 -0.70
 (0.07)  (0.07) (0.03) (0.20) (0.21) (0.10) (0.09) (0.27) (0.77) (0.78) (0.38) (0.38) (0.12) (0.10) (0.00) (0.02)
EXECRR 1.90 1.92 4.97 - - - 3.10 - 2.85 2.97 - - 2.43 2.45 4.37 -
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) - - - (0.16) - (0.18) (0.29) - - (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) -
EXECRR*GINI(-1) -0.06 -0.06 -0.16 - - - -0.10 - -0.08 -0.08 - - -0.39 -0.39 -0.14 -
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) - - - (0.16) - (0.22) (0.35) - - (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) -
BNKV1052(-1)  -  -  - 0.30 0.31 0.08 - 0.84  - - 0.63 0.65 - - - 2.51
 -  -  - (0.26) (0.24) (0.55) - (0.37)  - - (0.11) (0.09) - - - (0.03)
BNKV1052(-1)*GINI(-1)  -  -  - -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 - -0.03  - - -0.02 -0.02 - - - -0.08
 -  -  - (0.27) (0.25) (0.00) - (0.29)  - - (0.08) (0.06) - - - (0.04)
dlog(GDP)*GINI(-1) -1.22  -  - -1.75 - -2.31 0.35 0.31 -1.77 - -2.18 - -12.52 - -1.90 -0.21
(0.00)  -  - (0.00) - (0.11) (0.82) (0.86) (0.01) - (0.01) - (0.10) - (0.37) (0.93)
dlog(GDP)*GINI(-1)*DPG  - -1.25  - - -1.79 - - -  - -1.85 - -2.33 - -11.40 - -
 - (0.00)  - - (0.00) - - -  - (0.07) - (0.02) - (0.09) - -
dlog(GDP)*GINI(-1)*DNG  - -1.17  - - 1.69 - - -  - -1.73 - -2.10 - -16.54 - -
 - (0.00)  - - (0.00) - - -  - (0.02) - (0.00) - (0.05) - -
Number of observations 434 434 249 360 360 192 117 102 111 111 96 96 329 329 157 115
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.99 1.99 1.75 2.10 2.10 1.58 1.89 2.00 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.83 2.08 2.08 2.22 2.26
Notes: (1) for OECD the inequality measure is the decile ratio (D9/D1). Numbers in brackets are p-values.
LIS
Set of distribution data
Dependent variables: b=budget balance-to-GDP ratio; ECOFR= economic freedom (index); LEGEL= legislative election (dummy); EXECRR= political orientation of government (1=right, 0=centre-left); FR=quality of fiscal rules (index); BNKV1052= number of anti-
government protests; DPG= 1 if positive real GDP growth and 0 otherwise; DNP= 1 if negative real GDP growth and 0 otherwise. A more detailed description of the political variables is provided in the Annex.
OECD(1)UNU-WIDER
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Table 5: Panel regressions – interaction terms 
Unbalanced panels. GLS estimation with country fixed effects and White cross-section weights.
Dependent variable: budget balance to GDP ratio
D&S EUROSTAT
b(-1) 0.75 0.75 0.43 0.70 0.69 0.35 0.54 0.66 0.79 0.81 0.62 0.62 0.43 0.36
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
b(-2)  -  - - - - - - -0.09 - - - - - -
 -  -  -  -  -  -  - (0.59)  -  -  -  -  -  -
GINI(-1) 0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 0.08 0.08 0.26 0.13 2.14 2.11 0.16 -0.02
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.48) (0.66) (0.69) (0.42) (0.26) (0.34) (0.02) (0.23) (0.00) (0.0) (0.08) (0.91)
dlog(GDP(-1)) 79.00 83.67 23.55 87.55 97.62 121.44 37.05 27.28 72.96 97.23 83.83 95.06 114.39 16.40
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.50) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.58)
ECOFR 0.75 0.72 - 0.96 0.94 - -0.05 0.13 -0.02 -0.31 - - - -
 (0.00)  (0.00) - (0.00) (0.00) - (0.91) (0.77) (0.94) (0.70) - - - -
FR  -  - 0.84 - - 0.84 -  - - - - - 0.26 0.48
 -  - (0.00) - - (0.00) -  - - - - - (0.23) (0.21)
LEGEL -0.31 -0.33 -0.55 -0.23 -0.26 -0.61 -0.24 -0.36 -0.12 -0.14 -0.30 -0.27 -0.73 -0.88
 (0.18)  (0.14) (0.03) (0.38) (0.30) (0.04) (0.28) (0.10) (0.78) (0.78) (0.21) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00)
EXECRR 2.17 2.04 3.99 - - - 2.50  - 2.97 - 2.72 2.83 4.88 -
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) - - - (0.32)  - (0.17) - (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) -
EXECRR*GINI(-1) -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 - - - -0.09  - -0.08 - -0.43 -0.45 -0.16 -
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) - - - (0.26)  - (0.21) - (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) -
BNKV1052(-1)  -  - - -0.41 -0.56 0.09 - 2.07 - -0.60 - - - -0.04
 -  - - (0.16) (0.14) (0.91) - (0.09) - (0.27) - - - (0.98)
BNKV1052(-1)*GINI(-1)  -  - - 0.01 0.02 -0.01 - -0.08 - 0.02 - - - -0.01
 -  - - (0.20) (0.19) (0.62) - (0.08) - (0.21) - - - (0.97)
dlog(GDP(-1))*GINI(-1) -2.02  - - -2.40 - -3.41 -0.19 - -1.74 -2.66 -17.70 - -2.81 0.44
(0.00)  - - (0.00) - (0.02) (0.91) - (0.11) (0.12) (0.03) - (0.10) (0.86)
dlog(GDP(-1))*GINI(-1)*DPG  - -2.12 - - -2.70 - -  - - - - -20.69 - -
 - (0.00) - - (0.00) - -  - - - - (0.01) - -
dlog(GDP(-1))*GINI(-1)*DNG  - -2.82 - - -3.47 - -  - - - - -29.84 - -
 - (0.00) - - (0.01) - -  - - - - (0.00) - -
Number of observations 431 431 247 337 337 190 116 96 111 94 329 329 157 106
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.01 1.98 1.75 2.06 2.03 1.55 1.86 1.81 0.68 0.68 2.02 2.00 2.16 2.30
Set of distribution data
UNU-WIDER LIS OECD(1)
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Our indicator of cyclical conditions - real GDP growth - is not standard. Most empirical 
studies examining the determinants of fiscal performance use output gap estimates, that is 
the difference between actual and potential output expressed in percent of potential GDP. 
However, output gap estimates are typically surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty. In 
particular, estimates available in real time, that is when governments adopt the budget, 
differ significantly from those available ex post, because they involve expectations about 
future output growth. As these forecasts are revised when actual data become available 
output gap estimates change. Such changes tend to be large and significantly alter the 
assessment of cyclical conditions. Forni and Momigliano (2004) have shown that ex-post 
output gap estimates have a weaker explanatory power than those underpinning actual 
fiscal policy decisions. 
In spite of their superiority, the availability of real-time output gap estimates is generally 
limited in time. Sets of comparable real-time estimates for panel regressions, are available 
only since the mid-1990s. In light of this limitation we decided to use actual growth as a 
proxy for cyclical conditions. 
Since fiscal policy can have an impact on the real level of economic activity, real GDP 
could be endogenous with respect to the fiscal balance and therefore bias our estimation 
results. To account for this possibility, we redo our complete set of regressions by replacing 
real GDP growth of year t with real GDP growth of the preceding year. Apart from 
addressing the endogeneity issue, using lagged real GDP growth as a proxy for cyclical 
conditions may have an additional advantage, as it may better reflect the actual dynamics of 
fiscal policy making. In particular, when preparing the budget for year t at the end of year t-
1 decisions are likely to be influenced by the economic situation prevailing at that moment 
in time. 
Also the inequality measure (Gini coefficient and decile ratio) enters our regression 
equations in lagged form. This is to account for a possible simultaneous feedback between 
fiscal policy and income distribution: changes in the budget balance in year t may have a 
contemporaneous redistributive effect.  
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Overall, the regression results relating to the basic specifications, i.e. without interaction 
terms, are not very conclusive as regards the role of income inequality. After controlling for 
other explanatory variables the estimated coefficient of the inequality measure has the 
expected negative sign across all datasets - except the one of the OECD which is based on 
pre-tax data – but is rarely statistically significant at conventional levels. 
The results for the other explanatory variables confirm the findings in the literature and/or 
our priors. Real GDP growth is estimated to have a statistically significant and positive 
impact on the budget. More importantly, the size of the estimated coefficient(s) is broadly 
in line with the standard sensitivity of the government budget with respect to GDP, which, 
depending on the size of government, lies between around 0.3 and 0.5 (see Girouard and 
André, 2005). Moreover, we find somewhat weaker, although for some of the datasets still 
statistically significant, evidence indicating that (i) elections tend to weigh on the budget 
balance, (ii) that right wing governments are characterised by a higher degree of fiscal 
discipline (or lower degree of fiscal indiscipline) than centre-left government and (iii) that 
fiscal rules have a positive impact on fiscal performance. These results are consistent with 
Debrun et al. (2008) and with Buti and Van den Noord (2004). Finally, our results also 
suggest that more conflict, as measured by the number of anti-government demonstration, 
can translate into higher deficits or lower budget surplus. This would corroborate the 
archetypical idea that governments tend to open public coffers when put under pressure 
from the street.  
Using lagged instead of contemporaneous real GDP growth as proxy for cyclical conditions 
does not alter the picture. The main conclusions derived from our first set of panel 
regressions are robust with respect to this change (see Table 3). 
While not particularly encouraging per se, the weak evidence in favour of a direct negative 
relationship between fiscal performance and income inequality emerging from the basic 
specifications does not necessarily imply that such a relationship does not exist. As 
hypothesised above, it may simply be an indication that a purely additive arrangement of 
explanatory variable does not do justice to the more complex interplay between the 
distribution of income on the one hand and political and economic variables on the other.  
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This conjecture is corroborated by the regression results, reported in Table 4, relating to the 
more complex specifications explicitly allowing for interaction terms. They confirm a weak 
and statistically insignificant direct impact of the distribution of income on the budget 
balance, yet provide fairly robust evidence that income distribution can have an impact 
through more circuitous ways, in combination with other variables. The robustness of our 
results is strengthened by the fact, that our different sets of distribution data cover different 
time periods as well as slightly different groups of countries.7 
To start with, we find an interesting interaction with the political colour of government. The 
preference for more fiscal discipline among right wing governments, which is confirmed by 
the estimated stand-alone coefficient of the respective dummy, weakens as the inequality of 
income rises. This is evidenced by the fact that the slope dummy capturing the interaction 
between a right wing government and the measure of income inequality has a negative 
algebraic sign and turns out to be statistically significant at standard confidence levels 
across most specifications and datasets. Taking the combined effect of the respective 
coefficients, our estimates would seem to suggest that income inequality can crowd out the 
relative preference of right wing governments for fiscal discipline when Gini coefficients 
rise above readings between 28 and 32. Interestingly, these values broadly corresponds to 
the average Gini coefficient in the datasets used in our study. 
The appeal of this finding is twofold. First, it would seem to corroborate the intuition 
underlying the model by Cuckierman and Meltzer (1989) whereby increasing income 
inequality would give rise to political pressure favouring deficit spending. Second, it seems 
to be consistent with an interesting feature of the political debate that took place in the EU 
in the aftermath of the Great Recession. When faced with the need to design and implement 
incisive fiscal consolidation measures even right wing governments started thematising 
distributional issues.8 
                                                            
7 To 'iron out' possible breaks in the UNU-Wider series, we have also run regressions using moving averages 
of lagged Gini coefficients. The main findings turn out to be robust with respect to this adjustment. 
8 See for instance Le Monde of April 1, 2010, Bouclier Fiscal: Nicolas Sarkozy face a' la fronde de la 
majorite' and Boomerang fiscal. 
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The second revealing interaction relates to political (in)stability. Our regression results 
suggest that if paired with political instability as measured by the number of anti-
government demonstrations, income inequality tends to weigh on the budget balance. The 
most likely interpretation of this result, which is fairly robust for the different sets of 
distribution data considered, is that income inequality does not translate into unfunded 
redistributive fiscal policies as long as the overall political situation is stable. In the face of 
political protests, however, income inequality seems to lead to higher deficits or lower 
surpluses most likely on the back of governments' attempts to calm the situation by handing 
out money to the less-well off.  
Interestingly, and not surprisingly, this political economy interaction seems to be 
significant only for major instabilities. It is not confirmed when using indicators that 
capture less dramatic political changes such as the number of veto players (i.e. major 
institutional figures such as the prime minister or the president) that step down in a given 
year.  
The amplified budgetary effect of political conflicts in combination with a higher degree of 
income inequality is lost when contemporaneous real GDP growth is replaced with its 
lagged value, i.e. when accounting for the likely endogeneity between economic growth 
and the budget balance. As is evident from Table 5, the respective interaction term mostly 
carries a positive algebraic sign and is not statistically significant. The direct channel, by 
contrast, is confirmed to be negative.  
Although less eloquent than the stories associated with the previous two interactions, the 
third type of interaction emerging from our panel regressions is potentially more serious 
because more important in practice. In particular, we find that inequality tends to dampen 
the impact of economic growth on the budget balance. The coefficient of the interaction 
term capturing the interplay between inequality and real GDP growth is negative and in 
most cases statistically significant. This effect goes on top of those associated with the 
political affiliation of government and political instability.  
As fiscal policy is often found to be asymmetric across the cycle (see for instance 
Balassone et al., 2008 and the European Commission, 2006) we have also tested separate 
dummies for positive and negative real GDP growth, the respective hypothesis being that 
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inequality dampens the effect of economic growth on the budget more during expansions 
than during contractions.9 However, we do not find statistically significant evidence for this 
in the data. The hypothesis of equality of coefficients cannot be rejected at standard 
confidence levels. 
Nevertheless, bearing in mind that years of positive economic growth are more frequent 
than years of contraction, the dampening effect of inequality on the budgetary sensitivity 
with respect to growth can have a significant impact over time. At the average reading of 
our Gini coefficients an increase in equality by one unit reduces the impact of GDP on the 
budget balance to GDP ratio by around 0.02 percentage points. For purely illustrative 
purposes, and using real GDP growth of the euro area, Figure 1 simulates the cumulated 
effect of real GDP growth on the budget balance for three different degrees of income 
inequality: a Gini coefficient of 28, which is about the average in our different data sources, 
and two alternative values of 33 and 25.10  
Figure 1: Cumulated effect of economic growth on the budget balance for different degrees of income 
inequality. 
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9 The asymmetric behaviour over the cycle in combination with income inequality cannot be implemented for 
distribution data of EUROSTAT as the matrix of regressors including the respective dummies is not well 
defined. 
10  Examples of countries with a GINI of 25 or less are Austria, Sweden and Norway. Examples of countries 
with a GINI of 33 and more are Greece, Portugal and the United Kingdom.  
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Over a period of about 15 years relatively small differences in the distribution of income - 
differences that are common in the EU - produce relatively large differences on the budget 
balance of around 3 percentage points of GDP. 
Why do countries with a pronounced inequality of income seems to benefit comparatively 
little from the additional government revenues accruing from economic growth? At this 
stage, and taking into account the aggregate level of our analysis, it is difficult to provide 
detailed answers to this question. An obvious conjecture relates to the typical political 
pressure to spend the revenues generated by economic growth. It is well possible that this 
pressure tends to increase with the degree of income inequality making it more difficult for 
policy makers to resist demands for higher spending or lower taxes. 
 
5. Summary and policy conclusions 
The pervasive tendency observed among developed and middle-income countries to run 
deficits across the cycle - the so called deficit bias - and, consequently, to accumulate 
government debt, is predominantly attributed to the 'common pool' problem: geographically 
or otherwise dispersed spending interests competing for government resources do not 
internalise costs for society as a whole and hence give rise to overspending. In this paper 
we examined an alternative explanation of the deficit bias, namely the distribution of 
income. Although there are a number of theories that hypothesise an interplay between 
income inequality and fiscal performance, to our knowledge, the link has not been 
empirically tested so far in the economic literature. 
To address the quality issues generally signalled in connection with secondary distribution 
data – available data are not based on a commonly agreed methodology – we used 
measures of income inequality from different sources. The idea of using different datasets 
is that the comparison across sources allows us to assess the robustness of results.  
Our empirical analysis tends to corroborate the conjecture according to which income 
inequality makes fiscal discipline more difficult. In line with expectations, the link between 
income distribution and fiscal performance is not a direct one. Rather, interactions with 
political factors are at play. The first type of interaction relates to the political orientation of 
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governments. In particular, an increase in the inequality of income tends to soften the 
relative preference for fiscal discipline that is characteristic of right wing governments. 
They seem to adapt their fiscal policy strategy when social conditions change into a 
direction that may trigger increasing calls for higher government spending.  
The second type of interaction is more straightforward. It suggests that, on top of directly 
weighing on a country’s fiscal performance, political instability can produce additional 
budgetary costs when combined with a more skewed distribution of income. It should be 
noted however, that the statistical evidence for this type of interaction is less conclusive. 
The third and somewhat less obvious channel through which inequality seems to impinge 
on fiscal performance works in combination with economic growth: a higher degree of 
income inequality is associated with a muted impact of economic growth on the budget. 
One way to read this result is that political pressure to spend additional revenues accruing 
from growth mounts as the distribution of income becomes more uneven. 
These three main findings support observations and policy conclusions that seem to be 
relevant especially in the aftermath of the post-2007 global financial and economic crisis. 
First, the decision taken in some countries to impose higher taxes on those who purportedly 
benefitted excessively from the preceding economic progression - which turned out to be 
unsustainable - is primarily a move dictated by the political opportunity of the moment in 
view of the mounting dissatisfaction of some parts of the electorate with how the gains of 
economic growth had been distributed. Nevertheless, consciously or not such decisions 
may also be grounded in the understanding that the prospective consolidation of the dismal 
state of public finances could be much more difficult if politics turned a blind eye on the 
distribution of income. More specifically, our results suggest that inattention with respect to 
the distribution of income could ultimately trade off unfavourably with sustainability. It 
could give rise to mounting political pressure for higher redistributive spending at a time 
when the priority is to reduce spending and to use additional revenues to improve the fiscal 
situation.  
Hence, when designing and implementing fiscal exit strategies for the medium to long run 
it may be worth assessing the distributional effects of alternative adjustment measures. A 
particular case in point are prospective pension reforms, which based on available 
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assessments may contribute to sustainable public finances but imply very low pension 
levels for a growing number of older people. This type of risk is acknowledged in the 2009 
Sustainability Report of the European Commission (2009). 
The more generalised conclusions would be that fiscal discipline is easier to safeguard in 
comparatively more even societies, as equality seems to moderate political pressures for 
overspending. 
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Annex  
 
Data sources of income distribution 
 
UNU-WIDER 2008-update Gini coefficients: Selection of countries and years used in our empirical analysis
Country Country code Years No. of obs.
Average 
Gini 
coefficient
1 Austria AT 1970, 1972, 1976, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1987, 1991,  1994-2005   20 26.4
2 Australia AU 1960-1969, 1976, 1981, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1995-1998, 2000-2002, 2004 23 24.2
3 Belgium BE 1969, 1973, 1975-1977, 1979, 1985-1990, 1992-2001, 2003-2006 26 30.6
4 Canada CA 1961, 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1973-1975, 1977, 1979-2000 31 29.8
5 Switzerland CH 1978, 1982, 1991, 1992, 1998, 2000-2002 8 33.1
6 Chile CL 1964, 1968, 1970-1992, 1994-1996, 1998-2000, 2003 32 51.6
7 Czech Republic CZ 1961-1966, 1968, 1970, 1973-1977, 1979-1981, 1983-1985, 1987-2006 39 21.1
8 Germany DE 1960, 1962, 1964, 1968-1970, 1973, 1975, 1978, 1980, 1983-2004 32 31.7
9 Denmark DK 1966, 1971, 1976, 1987, 1992, 2003-2006 9 33.9
10 Estonia EE 1981, 1986, 1988-1990, 1992-2006 20 33.9
11 Spain ES 1965, 1973, 1980, 1985, 1986, 1988-1990, 1994-2006 21 31.7
12 Finland FI 1962, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1985, 1987-2006 26 26.0
13 France FR 1962, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1994-2004 20 32.5
14 United Kingdom GB 1961-2003, 2005, 2006 45 28.2
15 Greece GR 1960-1974, 1979, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1993-2001, 2003-2006 33 39.1
16 Hungary HU 1962, 1964, 1967, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976-1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986-
1994, 1997, 1999-2001, 2005, 2006
28 24.4
17 Ireland IE 1973, 1980, 1987, 1994-2001, 2003-2006 15 32.9
18 Israel IL 1961, 1963, 1969, 1976, 1979, 1986, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001 10 38.9
19 Iceland IS 2004-2006 3 25.0
20 Italy IT 1967-1982, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995-2002, 2004-2006 32 35.1
21 Japan JP 1962-1965, 1967-1987, 1989, 1990, 1995, 1998 29 34.3
22 Republic of Korea KR 1961, 1964-1966, 1982-1985, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1995-1998, 2004 16 34.3
23 Luxembourg LU 1985, 1986, 1991, 1994-2001, 2003-2006 15 26.2
24 Mexico MX 1963, 1968-1970, 1975, 1977, 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2004, 2005
16 53.1
25 The Nederlands NL 1962, 1967, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987-2003, 2005, 2006 26 29.3
26 Norway NO 1963, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1984-2001, 2003-2006 29 27.5
27 New Zealand NZ 1960, 1961, 1963-1978, 1980, 1982-1987, 1989-1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001, 
2002, 2004
35 44.9
28 Poland PL 1960, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1980-2006 36 28.1
29 Portugal PT 1973, 1980, 1990, 1991, 1995-2001, 2004-2006 14 36.7
30 Russian Federation RU 1981, 1986, 1988-1991, 1994-2006 19 36.1
31 Sweden SE 1976-1986, 1989-2006 29 32.9
32 Slovenia SI 1990-2006 17 24.6
33 Slovakia SK 1987-2006 20 23.0
34 Turkey TR 1963, 1968, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1994, 2000 10 47.5
35 United States US 1960-2004 45 42.2
Total 829 32.64
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Gini coefficients from Deininger and Squire (1996): selection of countries and years used in our empirical analysis
Country Country code Years No. of obs. Mean Gini coefficient
1 Austria AT  -  -  - 
2 Australia AU 1969, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1990 9 37.88
3 Belgium BE 1979, 1985, 1988, 1992 4 27.01
4 Canada CA 1961, 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1973-1975, 1977, 1979, 1981-1991 21 31.17
5 Switzerland CH - - -
6 Chile CL 1968, 1971, 1980, 1989, 1994 5 51.84
7 Czech Republic CZ 1965, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1988, 1991-199 13 22.67
8 Germany DE 1963, 1969, 1973, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1984 7 31.22
9 Denmark DK 1976, 1981, 1987, 1992 4 32.08
10 Estonia EE 1992, 1993, 1995 3 34.66
11 Spain ES 1965, 1973, 1980, 1985-1989 8 27.90
12 Finland FI 1966, 1971, 1977-1984, 1987, 1991 12 29.93
13 France FR 1962, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1979, 1984 6 42.13
14 United Kingdom GB 1961-1991 31 25.98
15 Greece GR 1974, 1981, 1988 3 34.53
16 Hungary HU 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993 9 24.65
17 Ireland IE 1973, 1980, 1987 3 36.31
18 Israel IL - - -
19 Iceland IS - - -
20 Italy IT 1974-1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991 15 34.93
21 Japan JP 1962-1965, 1967-1982, 1985, 1989, 1990 23 34.82
22 Republic of Korea KR 1961, 1964-1966, 1968-1971, 1976, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1988 13 34.21
23 Luxembourg LU 1985 1 27.13
24 Mexico MX 1963, 1968, 1975, 1977, 1984, 1989, 1992 7 53.85
25 The Nederlands NL 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981-1983, 1985-1989, 1991 12 28.59
26 Norway NO 1962, 1967, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1984, 1986, 1991 8 34.21
27 New Zealand NZ 1973, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1985-1987, 1989, 199 12 34.36
28 Poland PL 1976, 1978-1993 17 25.69
29 Portugal PT 1973, 1980, 1990, 1991 4 37.44
30 Russian Federation RU - -  -
31 Sweden SE 1967, 1975, 1976, 1980-1990, 1992 15 31.63
32 Slovenia SI 1992, 1993 2 27.07
33 Slovakia SK 1992, 1993 2 20.49
34 Turkey TR 1968, 1973, 1987 3 50.36
35 United States US 1960-1991, 1987 33 35.49
Total 305 32.34
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Gini coefficients from the Luxembourg Income study: Selection of countries and years used in our empirical analysis
Country Country code Years
No. of 
obs.
Mean Gini 
coefficient
1 Austria AT 1987, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2000 5 26.14
2 Australia AU 1981, 1985, 1989, 1995, 2001, 2003 6 30.23
3 Belgium BE 1985, 1988, 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000 6 24.63
4 Canada CA 1971, 1975, 1981, 1987, 1991, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2000, 200 10 29.72
5 Switzerland CH 1982, 1992, 2000, 2002, 2004 5 28.76
6 Chile CL - - -
7 Czech Republic CZ 1992, 1996 2 23.30
8 Germany DE 1973, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000 8 26.40
9 Denmark DK 1987, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2004 5 23.22
10 Estonia EE 2000 1 36.10
11 Spain ES 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 4 32.75
12 Finland FI 1987, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2004 5 22.68
13 France FR 1979, 1981, 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000 6 28.77
14 United Kingdom GB 1969, 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2004 9 31.32
15 Greece GR 1995, 2000 2 34.10
16 Hungary HU 1991, 1994, 1999 3 29.93
17 Ireland IE 1987, 1994-1996, 2000 5 32.70
18 Israel IL 1979, 1986, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005 6 32.80
19 Iceland IS - - -
20 Italy IT 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2004 9 32.50
21 Japan JP - - -
22 Republic of Korea KR 1981, 1986, 1991, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2005, 2006 8 28.45
23 Luxembourg LU 1985, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2004 6 24.98
24 Mexico MX 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 9 47.56
25 The Nederlands NL 1983, 1987, 1991, 1994, 1999 5 25.40
26 Norway NO 1979, 1986, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2004 6 23.85
27 New Zealand NZ - - -
28 Poland PL 1986, 1992, 1995, 1999, 2004 5 29.44
29 Portugal PT - - -
30 Russian Federation RU 1992, 1995, 2000 3 42.53
31 Sweden SE 1967, 1975, 1981, 1987, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005 8 22.86
32 Slovenia SI 1997, 1999 2 24.95
33 Slovakia SK 1992, 1996 2 21.50
34 Turkey TR - - -
35 United States US 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2004 8 34.49
Total 159 29.70
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OECD decile ratios (D9/D1): Selection of countries and years used in our empirical analysis
Country Country code Years
No. of 
obs.
Mean 
decile ratio
1 Austria AT 2004-2007 4 3.29
2 Australia AU 1975-1995, 1997-2008 33 2.91
3 Belgium BE 1999-2006 8 2.40
4 Canada CA 1997-2008 12 3.66
5 Switzerland CH 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 6 2.55
6 Chile CL - - -
7 Czech Republic CZ 1997-2008 12 2.95
8 Germany DE 1984-2005 22 2.93
9 Denmark DK 1980-1990, 1996-2007 23 2.38
10 Estonia EE - - -
11 Spain ES 1995, 2002 2 3.88
12 Finland FI 1977, 1980, 1983, 1986-2007 25 2.44
13 France FR 1970-1998, 2000-2005 35 3.23
14 United Kingdom GB 1970-2008 39 3.34
15 Greece GR - - -
16 Hungary HU 1986, 1989, 1992-2006 17 4.02
17 Ireland IE 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003-2007 8 3.78
18 Israel IL - - -
19 Iceland IS - - -
20 Italy IT - - -
21 Japan JP 1975-2008 34 3.05
22 Republic of Korea KR 1884-2007 24 4.08
23 Luxembourg LU - - -
24 Mexico MX - - -
25 The Nederlands NL 1977-2005 29 2.67
26 Norway NO 1997-2002 6 2.01
27 New Zealand NZ 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994-2008 20 2.57
28 Poland PL 1992-1999, 2001, 2002, 2004 11 3.55
29 Portugal PT - - -
30 Russian Federation RU - - -
31 Sweden SE 1975, 1978, 1980-2004 27 2.15
32 Slovenia SI - - -
33 Slovakia SK - - -
34 Turkey TR - - -
35 United States US 1973-2008 36 4.29
Total 433 3.11
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EUROSTAT Gini coefficients: Selection of countries and years used in our empirical analysis
Country Country code Years No. of obs.
Mean Gini 
Coefficient
1 Austria AT 1995-2001, 2003-2008 13 25.5
2 Australia AU -  -  -
3 Belgium BE 1995-2001, 2003-2008 13 27.8
4 Canada CA -  -
5 Switzerland CH -  -
6 Chile CL -  -
7 Czech Republic CZ 2001, 2005-2008 5 25.2
8 Germany DE 1995-2001, 2005-2008 11 26.7
9 Denmark DK 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003-2008 10 23.0
10 Estonia EE 2000-2008 9 34.2
11 Spain ES 1995-2008 14 32.4
12 Finland FI 1996-2008 13 24.8
13 France FR 1995-2008 14 27.9
14 United Kingdom GB 1995-2003, 2005-2008 13 32.8
15 Greece GR 1995-2001, 2003-2008 13 33.9
16 Hungary HU 2000-2003, 2005-2008 8 26.8
17 Ireland IE 1995-2001, 2003-2008 13 31.7
18 Israel IL - -
19 Iceland IS 2004-2008 5 26.0
20 Italy IT 1995-2001, 2003-2008 12 31.3
21 Japan JP - -
22 Republic of Korea KR - -
23 Luxembourg LU - - 27.0
24 Mexico MX 1995-2003, 2005-2008 13
25 The Nederlands NL 1995-2003, 2005-2008 13 27.2
26 Norway NO 2003-2008 6 26.5
27 New Zealand NZ - -
28 Poland PL 2000, 2001, 2005-2008 6 32.2
29 Portugal PT 1995-2001, 2004-2008 12 36.8
30 Russian Federation RU - -
31 Sweden SE 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004-2008 9 23.0
32 Slovenia SI 2000-2003, 2005-2008 8 22.8
33 Slovakia SK 2005-2008 4 25.5
34 Turkey TR 2002, 2003 2
35 United States US - - 45.5
Total 239 28.9
 
 
Detailed definition of political variables used in our empirical analysis
Code Variable Description Source
EXECRR Political affiliation of government 
(Dummy)
Party orientation with respect to economic policy: 1=right, parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-
wing; 0=centre left, parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be described as centristparties as well as 
parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic.
World Bank DPI2006 Database of 
Political Institutions
LEGEL Legislative election  (Dummy) 1=there was a legislative election in this year; 0=otherwise World Bank DPI2006 Database of 
Political Institutions
GOVSP Government special interests (Dummy) 1=the party of the largest government party represents any special interests; 0=otherwise World Bank DPI2006 Database of 
Political Institutions
MAJ Margin of government majority 
(percent)
This is the fraction of seats held by the government. It is calculated by dividing the number of government seats by total 
(government plus opposition plus non-aligned) seats
World Bank DPI2006 Database of 
Political Institutions
HERFGO Herfindahl Index Government Index of party concentration in government. The sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the government. An increase of the 
index singals higher party concentration.
World Bank
DPI2006 Database of Political 
Institutions
HERFOP Herfindahl Index Opposition Index of party concentration of opposition. The sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in opposition. An increase of the index 
singals higher party concentration.
World Bank DPI2006 Database of 
Political Institutions
HERFTO Herfindahl Index Total Calculated in the same manner as the Herfindahl Government and Herfindahl Opposition, but for full parliamentary spectrum. World Bank
DPI2006 Database of Political 
Institutions
STABS Political stability (Dummy) These variables counts the percent of veto players who drop from the government in any given year. Veto players are major 
institutional figures or institutions and are a function of the political system. Veto players can be the prime minister, the president, 
chambers of parliment etc.
World Bank
DPI2006 Database of Political 
Institutions
BNKV1052 Number of anti-government 
demonstrations
Anti-government demonstrations, lagged two years. Number of any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary 
purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-
foreign nature.  Derived from the daily files of The New York Times
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) 
Report, Center for Global Policy, George 
Mason University.
SFTPUHVL Number of annual maximum magnitude 
of all events in progress
Major political and social upheavals such as ethnic conflicts, civil wars, revolutionary wars or regime crises. The annual maximum 
magnitude of all such events in progress are summed over the prior 15 years.crises
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) 
Report, Center for Global Policy, George 
Mason University.
ECOFR Economic freedom  The key ingredients of economic freedom are: personal choice, voluntary exchange coordinated by markets, freedom to enter and 
compete in markets, protection of persons and their property from aggression by others. A detailed description of the construction 
of the indicator and its ingredients can be found at http://www.freetheworld.com/2009/reports/world/EFW2009_BOOK.pdf. A 
higher rating indicates a greater degree of economic freedom. As data were available only on a 5-year basis, we have interpolated 
data to have yearly data. 
The Fraser Institute 2009
FR Fiscal rules Index calculated by the Directorate-General of Economic and Financial AFfairs of the European Commisison. It measures the 
strength  and coverage of fiscal rules in EU Member States. A higher value indicates a stronger and more comprehensive fiscal 
rule. A detailed description of how the index is constracted is provided in European Commission (2006).
European Commission
 
 
